



TRENDS IN ENERGY-INTENSIVENESS: 
 AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
T. Fleischer 
Prognostics on fuel and more specifically on power consumption by govern-
mental bodies are usually based on the economic growth i.e. on the assumption 
that a unit increase in GDP will result in some computed amount of increase in 
fuel and power consumption. 
1./ ONE-DIMENSIONAL COMPARISON 
Table 1 shows power consumption per capita in 1985 as stated in the latest of-
ficial long-term concept, comparing Hungary with some European countries and 
the States. Though the States and the Scandinavian countries are far ahead, the 
socialist countries fit quite well in the European average. 
 
Table 1 
 POWER CONSUMPTION 
 PER CAPITA 
(sorted in decreasing order) 
 
Country                  Gross power 
                               consumption 
                             kWh per capita 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Norway                 24729  
Sweden                 16623  
Finland             11367  
USA                 11176  
Switzerland         7435  
GDR                  6851  
FRG                  6739  
France               5817  
Belgium             5791  
Denmark             5778  
Austria              5663  
USSR                 5467  
CSSR                 5430  
Bulgaria             5148  
Great Britain      5039  
Holland              4466  
Italy                3664  
Poland               3645  
Hungary               3531  
Spain                3280  
Yugoslavia           3263  
Portugal             2083  
Table 2 
HOUSEHOLDS' POWER  
CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA 
(sorted in decreasing order) 
 
Country                  Household 
                               consumption 
                             kWh per capita 
 
------------------------------------ 
Norway            7381 
Sweden            3850 
USA               3306 
Finland           2478 
Switzerland       1829 
Belgium          1641 
FRG                1592 
France            1568 
Great Britain     1568 
Austria           1356 
Denmark           1326 
Holland           1110 
Bulgaria          1066 
GDR                  921 
Italy               779 
Yugoslavia        771 
CSSR              707 
Hungary            694 
Spain              620 
Portugal           443 
Poland             435 
USSR              -    
Table 3 
HOUSEHOLDS AS AGAINST 
TOTAL POWER CONSUMPTION 
(sorted in decreasing order) 
 
Country                Household 
                           consumption per 
                             gross power 
                             consumption 
---------------------------------------- 
Great Britain 0.311  
Norway                  0.298  
USA                      0.296  
Belgium                0.283  
France                   0.269  
Holland                 0.248  
Switzerland          0.246  
Austria                  0.239  
Yugoslavia            0.236  
FRG                      0.236  
Sweden             0.232  
Denmark            0.229  
Finland                  0.218  
Portugal                0.213  
Italy                   0.213  
Bulgaria                0.207  
Hungary           0.196  
Spain                   0.189  
GDR                     0.134  
CSSR                     0.130  
Poland                   0.119  
USSR                       --      
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If we consider the share of households in absolute figures and as against the 
gross consumption then a polarization becomes obvious (Tables 2 and 3).  Table 3 
shows only Yugoslavia to approach the European average while Spain has a share 
similar to those of the socialist countries (with the USSR values being unknown). 
Such more or less one-dimensional comparisons tend to suggest that an increase 
in GDP goes hand in hand with an increase in power consumption, or even that the 
rise in GDP is based on a rising power consumption - which means on increasing the 
power supply capacities. 
However, we may get a clearer picture if we look at the other factor, the GDP as 
well. 
2./ TWO-DIMENSIONAL COMPARISON 
 
Figure 1. Gross electric power consumtion per capita against the GDP/capita 
Kerényi [2] considered a few countries more, and he lined them up by their GDP 
per capita (representing the respective degree of development), by their total power 
consumption per capita (kWh/head), and by their total fuel consumption per capita 
(GJ/head).  We take now what he stated for 1985.  Using his own corrected values 
for computing the heat equivalents he got some results that differ from what we have 
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shown before, but nevertheless the trend is clear so for the details we will just refer 
the reader to Kerényi's paper [2]. 
We used the separate diagrams by Kerényi [2] to devise a two-dimensional one 
with the method used by Miklóssy [3].  In Fig.1 we represented the total power con-
sumption (kWh/head), and in Fig.2 the total fuel consumption (GJ/head) as against 
the GDP ($/head) in 1985.  The two representations being of the same type we shall 
describe the analyses based on Fig.2. 
 
Figure 2. Direct total energy consumption per capita against the GDP/capita 
Most European countries fit in a trend line starting at the origo and proceeding 
continuously up to GDP=12 000 $: from here the States also join the trend.  Japan 
and Switzerland are falling behind, while Norway and Sweden are considerably 
above the average or trend line, which means less respectively far higher fuel con-
sumption ratios.  Fig.1 shows Finland and the States to have by far the highest total 
power consumption just as seen also in Table 1.  This is obviously due to the abun-
dance of cheap hydraulic energy - the others having less, or having less intensively 
developed their own fuel resources.  When we say "cheap" hydraulic energy this is 
no generic but a specific term as we know hydraulic energy can be "expensive" or 
"cheap". 
In Fig.2 we see another group of countries showing a caracteristic deviation from 
the general trend, and these are particularly interesting to us as they are exactly the 
socialist countries.  Their GDP levels are comparable to those of Portugal, Greece, 
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Spain and Ireland - and they even figure twice, because Kerényi had assessed their 
GDP on his own as there were no such data published, taking the actual Hungarian 
GDP as a datum line. 
We can, however, clearly see that the socialist countries are using up twice or 
three times as much power as their European counterparts do for industrial purposes.  
This means that the one-dimensional representation is misleading when suggesting 
that our power consumption levels fit the European average and thus we should need 
more power if we are to see the household share increasing. Both Fig.1 and Fig.2 
show clearly that if the socialist countries stopped their hugely power-wasting prac-
tices the today's power supply should be more than sufficient, in fact even if the GDP 
were doubled or trebled - leaving still room for a shift in structure to the benefit of 
household electrification.  We might add that if the Hungarian GDP were correctly 
defined, then our own power- wasting would make up not the treble only the double 
of what we ought to consume at the actual stage of development. 
Now this was only to show what contradictions there had been in 1985: to see 
what we ought to do next requires some more detailed analyses. 
3./ THREE-DIMENSIONAL COMPARISON 
Miklóssy [3] has already stated that a trend computed for a given period of time 
(which in his logarithmic scale is not linear) is not necessarily valid for each and 
every country: they may have different time scales or trend lines of their own. 
 
Figure 3.  Development paths calculating with the time dimension 
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Éva Ehrlich [4] computed trends for 1970, 1975 and 1980 by the same method as 
used for Fig.2 and these show a decline. 
In Fig.3 we show the consequences of this decline, with the time dimension on 
the same level as in Fig.2. 
At any point in the "European trend" of 1985 we see an almost identical fuel 
consumption per 1 $ GDP: in actual fact this is represented in the direction tangent of 
the trend line expressed as GJ/$.  If the straight section of the trend passes through 
the origo then GJ/$ is a constant value.  A more accurate adaptation results in a 
slightly steeper trend line which has, however, no bearing on the conclusions. 
After three, or five, years the trend line as such slips down to a lower level that is 
the same level of development goes with a lower average of fuel consumption.  This 
means that after a while the individual trends of each country step down from the up-
per limit to the lower limit line: the specific economic growth ratio (GDP) implies a 
lesser increase of fuel consumption - while the gross power consumption per capita 
may slightly increase (less than the GDP does), or it may stagnate, or it may even 
decrease!  This is what the arrows between the trend lines show in Fig.3.  Now the 
question whether new capacities are needed or not will obviously depend on whether 
the total consumption does grow or not (replacements are not deemed to be "new" 
capacities...) 
Trend line curvatures suggest that there is at least an approach to be expected be-
tween socialist and non-socialist countries: trends might become at least parallel to 
one another.  However, power supply is a strategic, a "pushing" industry and new 
projects are greatly affected by plans that happen to aim not even at the socialist 
trend but rather at the tangent of it. 
4./ WHERE ARE WE NOW? 
Hungary ought to switch over to the European trend, this has already been ex-
pressed in Fig.2.  However, these last years there was almost no move toward that 
target: fuel price increase did not lead to decreasing the specific consumption as ex-
pected but rather to a decrease in GDP [2]  This decrease in GDP has been at the root 
of the fact that since 1970 our power consumption growth has eventually dropped 
from 8 or 9 to 2 or 3 %. 
The official prognostics [1] reckon with 1.5% power consumption growth by 
1995 and with a constant 2.5% after that, expecting a total consumption of 64 460 
GWh for the year 2010.  (Figure 4.)  Now if instead of taking these figures we extra- 
polate what happened between 1970 and 1985 and assume that power consumption 
growth rate decreases by one percent point instead of two in every five years, than 
we come to 33 900 GWh, roughly half of what is officially expected for 2010 (with 
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an increase of +0.5% by 1995, of -0.5% by 2000, of -1.5% by 2005, and of -2.5% by 
2010).  What this means is that the total power consumption in 2010 will not be 
higher than what it was in 1983. 
 
Figure 4   The yearly increase of the elecricity consumption 
 To those who would object that this is not serious, a mere juggling with figures 
based on the past decrease which was due to a decline in GDP, we should like to 
point out that the official prognostics based on economic growth (GDP) are in no 
way more serious.  On the contrary, the official prognostics reckon with an economic 
growth due to a structural turnover while planning to provide for power supply ca-
pacities needed and measured only by those old structures. 
Therefore what we need is to consider two alternatives: 
- there will be no structural turnover: then there is no reason for us to expect that 
the GDP will stop to decrease.  Therefore extrapolating the facts of the last 
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15 years is correct, and doubling the power supply capacities is not justifi-
able, or 
- there will be a structural turnover: then there is nothing to justify our planning 
for capacities calculated by wasteful practices of structures moving along the 
"socialist trend" - what we have today would be more than enough if our 
production structures were updated, in fact it would suffice for a GDP twice 
the amount we have now and by the time we reach that level the same 
amount of power supply might be enough for an even higher level of produc-
tion. 
Now what is most certainly not to dois to mix the elements of these two alterna-
tives: economic growth is not to be used as a slogan - its premisses and consequences 
have fully to be considered, in every branch of the economy. 
What we must know is this: we cannot afford to move along either of the two 
paths - we have to move off the past trend line which was and is the result of an ex-
tensive, self consuming, wasteful and pauperizing economy, and we have to try to 
approach the "European trend" as fast as we can.  Now this cannot be achieved if we 
go on thinking wasteful - we simply cannot afford to implement capacities which are 
overrated today and will be overrated when we have achieved the turnover.  We must 
see that even if there is some need for more power supply this will only be tempo-
rary: we are not to build new capacities to satisfy a merely temporary need - such 
needs should be covered by imports. 
5./ ENVIRONMENT-ORIENTED STRATEGIES 
International comparison shows that there exists apart from the socialist model a 
more effective strategy - though it does not show what this strategy is. 
We must, however, see that even though the actual difference is huge the Euro-
pean countries never ceased to try to force their energy consumption down even 
more: they believe they need a structural turnover to achieve this goal... 
In the social economy power supply is deemed to be a pushing industry - it has 
always been the promise for a better future and as such it has consumed the sources 
in a continued battle of distribution.  Never, not even in the fourties when a correla-
tion between more electric power and a higher degree of development was true, has it 
automatically been true that the two are in a causal relation with one another, just as 
it has never been proved that forcing new industrial capacities might lead to jumping 
several steps in economic development.  Non-socialist countries with their market 
and profit oriented economies had an inbuilt regulator which forced them to produce 
energy with the less possible cost - this was an advantage.  What we have to see now 
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is that this advantage was available also to all the socialist countries if they had cho-
sen to see it: so the advantage is fictitious not real. 
That a cost-conscious power supply has advantages has only appeared after the 
shock of the oil price explosion - and at the same time it became clear that we are to 
think of the future and of natural conservancy.  Now we now that an ecological 
catastrophy is perfectly possible: it becomes evident that we must see how we can 
best prevent it. 
This is what we mean by environment-oriented strategies: a complex considera-
tion of the possible correlations, a balance of natural resources, the reckoning with 
the limits of the natural resources, the recycling of waste (enthropy).  As a first step 
we need to identify the ecological bases, the philosophy - and only then can we pro-
ceed to find ways of how to cope with the problems. 
Today, we believe, philosophy has a major importance: we need to know about 
and to identify ourselves with natural conservancy: it won't do merely to know what 
official regulations we are to satisfy.  Official regulations should be considered a 
minimum requirement - to stop health impairing technologies, sooth, gas, steam, 
dust, radiation, noise immission should be a common-sense general requirement.  
Environment-oriented energy strategies are more than that: they should not be con-
cerned with official regulations but with a complex consideration of the natural cy-
cles involved. 
We all only try to identify the main pillars of environment-oriented strategies - 
but what we can see now is that the European trends are nearer to such targets than 
we are.  Therefore we should think there is nothing to lose in trying to approach what 
they do. 
And what they do is to promote development by waste-free technologies, mate-
rial and energy saving methods, and by an ambundance of information.  In contrast, 
the socialist model is very strict on information while being wasteful in material and 
energy. This is a pattern contrary to modern technology, to natural conservancy, to 
the general rules of evolution and thus there can be no doubt that the decrease in 
GDP is no temporary phenomenon: it is the sign of a final dead end. 
A free flow of information and a readiness to support any local enterprise is what 
suits natural conservancy.  This is also in line with the general wish of individuals for 
an appropriate role in society which is unimaginable without sufficient information 
(self-employment, self-management, local autonomy).  Those methods which were 
based on concentrating information have led to wasting material, resources, and en-
ergy, and those "economic" solutions based on limiting knowledge and responsibility 
by reserving the decisions to "central bodies" have proved to be wrong ("optimum-
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size" companies, concentration of local government powers, of schools, of people 
which led to the depopulation of villages and smallholders's cottages). 
Return on capital, loans, and projects ought to be seen in a wide context - and 
this applies to energy management as well.  They ought to be seen in terms of their 
long-term effects on every aspect they might influence: this will be consistent with 
economic and ecologic considerations.  Market oriented, profit oriented mechanisms 
are necessary and well- proven regulators to be built in, but they cannot be seen as 
the main values: today we all are badly in need of a new scale of values to pursue. 
April 1989  Budapest 
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